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From generation to generation, the continuum of human time has held over centuries 
of centuries without rupture or break. We readily believe that this succession is given, 
through nature or life; we discover that it must be built. Cultures and religions are 
useful for the construction of that sequence, for the pursuit of time, for the collective 
immortality of the groups that…create their time, for their continued creation, for the 






Romulus kills Remus and Rome was founded. 
 
In recent years there has been a growing scholarly engagement with the relation between the 
broader area of intellectual property rights and cultural heritage.2 A swift overlook of their 
subject matter – creation of cultural objects and goods, recognition of cultural values, 
dissemination of knowledge and creativity – demonstrates a similar purpose to protect and 
promote human expressions, which in turn bring to the fore the notions of culture, ownership, 
and rights. Thus, it is not surprising that the relationship between copyright law and cultural 
heritage has often been considered through the prism of proprietary notions and the distinctions 
they entail: private/public, individual/collective. The relevance and the extent to which 
intellectual property rights provide an appropriate framework for achieving such protection has 
been an ongoing question.3 For right reasons, while there has been some successful protection 
of cultural heritage through the IP instruments, the focus has predominately been directed 
towards questioning the commodifying techniques and the processes of propertization that IP, 
and in particular copyright, entail in that regard. The questions about the way and extent to 
which they contrast, or for that matter overlap, have been pertinent when contextualising their 
subject matter and somewhat equivocal relation.  
 
                                                
1 Michel Serres, Statues: The Second Book of Foundations (Bloomsbury 2015) 7. 
2 Estelle Derclaye (ed), Copyright and Cultural Heritage: Preservation and Access to Works in a Digital World 
(Edward Elgar 2010) Laetitia La Follette (ed), Negotiating Culture: Heritage, Ownership, and Intellectual 
Property (University of Massachusetts Press 2013); Helle Porsdam (ed), Copyrighting Creativity: Creative 
Values, Cultural Heritage Institutions and System of Intellectual Property (Ashgate 2015). 
3 See eg Lucas Lixinski, Intangible Cultural Heritage in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) Ch 
6; Janet Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law (OUP 2015) Ch 7. 




It is this relation between copyright and heritage that this paper takes as a starting point of 
investigation.4 With that difference, it does not engage with questions about whether IP 
instruments are effective or not for safeguarding cultural heritage, or how heritage artefacts 
and practices become subjected to the ever-present commodifying impulse of IP rights.5 
Although implicated, neither it pursues commenting on the critical cultural, economic, and 
political issues and effects that copyright and heritage as instruments precipitate. Instead, it 
engages with another trajectory that does not approach cultural heritage as an object of 
observation, subjected to the objectifying gaze of copyright law, or for that matter discourse, 
but approaches heritage as a means through which to think of copyright. Situating the 
investigation alongside heritage and its aspects allows not only to identify their similar 
foundation and purpose, but more specifically, it also provides passages through which 
copyright’s subject matter and its edifice can be differently perceived.  
 
The paper begins by considering relation as a preceding element that informs the systems of 
copyright and heritage both in terms of their subject matter and function. Since these relations 
imply beginnings and ends, the notion of origin appears not only as a feature that pertains their 
normative conceptualisation and narratives, but also as a critical point that both copyright and 
heritage are inherently dependent upon. Through interpretative reading, the second part, 
approaches origin as a technique of division that frames their systems of relations. However, 
the origin is not reduced only to a principle that gives rise to ownership and rights, but more 
importantly it is recognised as a temporal quality. From here, the discussion acknowledges this 
quality that fundamentally embodies the existence of both copyright and cultural heritage, and 
which gives rise to their narratives, histories, memories, preservation (of their subject matter 
and themselves). This temporal aspect is not only related to the (temporary) conservation of 
cultural expressions and manifestations, but also to recognising time (past, present and future) 
as a quality that informs systems of knowledge, culture, legal practice or mode of thinking. 
While such a temporal investigation of copyright is relevant on its own, considering it through 
the notion of heritage appears to be apposite. 
 
With this in view, the ending focuses only on copyright and its times. The reasons for this are 
both space and time constraining. The discussion continues beyond cultural heritage, and aims 
to open up a passage to questioning copyright (law) as a temporal category. The aim here is 
not to reduce the agency of time as an element that serves the pragmatics of its functioning, but 
to approach time as an embodiment of copyright’s normative and conceptual formation. To 
this end, in contrast to the spatial conceptions that have framed copyright and its discourse ever 
since, this paper proposes to study copyright law temporally.     
                                                
4 In this paper, the terms cultural heritage and heritage are used interchangeably. 
5 Also, the terms safeguarding and protection are used interchangeably. Blake argues that the former is more 
encompassing concerning cultural heritage. Blake (n 3) 11-12. 




Finally, this paper approaches these notions by engaging with the work by the French 
philosopher of science Michel Serres, for whom relations as a manifold quality constitute 
structures and precedes any system formations, understood here in its broadest sense such as 
knowledge, society, culture and law. His thought and writing disperse and bridge disparate 
categories of discipline and knowledge, by drawing on mathematics, religion, myths, 
philosophy, sciences, literature and law.6 Moreover, questions of origin and time in 
construction of social relations, cultures, and knowledge are instances he constantly refers to 
in his expansive scholarship. Following his writing, as well as having heritage as a means 
through which we traverse spaces and times, the discussion here is similarly spread across, 





In Roman mythology, Janus is god of beginnings and ends. His name etymologically is 
related to the Latin word ianua, which designates a door, or arched passageway. Janus 
built an enclosure with gates at each end joined by a passageway, which were only 
closed when Rome was not in war. Peace was a rear occasion. Depicted as a bearded 
god with two heads, he is a god of duality, able to see forwards and backwards, thus 
personifies change and transformation which essentially is actualised by the passing of 
time. He is also patron of division of time and the month of January is associated with 
him. 7 Janus is a god of time.  
 
Law, or ius, etymologically designates ‘that which is binding’, and shares the same root with 
iungere, meaning ‘to join’. Law joins two positions by binding them together in order to 
regulate their relation. On the condition of having recognised the end points as legal subjects, 
and their object of interaction, law validates itself in the relation, and thus this positioning is 
what fundamentally underpins law and sustains its edifice.8  
 
Copyright law founds its normativity on the basis of being a property right, which law defines 
as a relation between subjects towards an object. Such a relational right presupposes a division 
of two end positions: an author that creates and the public that uses the copyright work. This 
proprietary ordering establishes the dichotomous axis around which copyright law and its 
discourse revolve. The communication of the object (a copyright work) between these subjects 
                                                
6 See eg Michel Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy (Josué V Harari and David F Bell eds, John 
Hopkins University Press 1982); Bruno Latour, ‘The Enlightenment Without the Critique: A Word on Michel 
Serres’ Philosophy’ in Allen P Griffiths (ed), Contemporary French Philosophy (CUP 1987); Niran Abbas (ed), 
Mapping Michel Serres (The University of Michigan Press 2005). 
7 Calian Davenport, ‘Who was Janus, the Roman God of Beginnings and Endings? (The Conversation, 31 
December 2017) <https://theconversation.com/who-was-janus-the-roman-god-of-beginnings-and-endings-
86853> accessed 25 May 2018. 
8 ‘Relations spawn objects, beings and acts, not vice versa.’ Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, Conversations on 
Science, Culture, and Time (University of Michigan Press 1995) 107.   




is instrumentalised through ownership as a central ‘legal technique of personification and 
reification’.9 As such, copyright law prescribes the principles according to which an author 
(owner) is recognised, their rights are granted, the criteria according to which a copyright 
subsists in a work, its duration, and the way in which the public can use and access those works 
of creation.10 To put it another way, the law manifests itself as the instrument that both informs 
and enables the relation and sets the rules and principles according to which this 
communication can be achieved.11 In such ordering, now internationally recognised, and on 
the basis of its justifications, it is generally held that copyright law actively partakes in the 
protection and promotion of creativity and knowledge of the human civilisation.12 
 
Comparably, the notion of heritage, as its etymological root designates, fundamentally 
concerns the recognition and transmission of cultural expressions, skills, practices and their 
manifestations.13 It signifies a body of tangible and intangible manifestations and expressions 
(objects) which value becomes apparent only through, or as a result of, their communication 
between subjects. For these reasons, heritage is considered a crucial instrument for recognising 
and preserving the links between communities and their identities, which are manifested in 
different forms of cultural expression.14 In considering this transmission by which heritage 
becomes an ‘act of communication’, therefore, it can be contended that heritage manifests itself 
as a relation through which subjects and objects assemble, and the moment in which its value 
is actualised.15 This value, however, is subject to procedural instruments of affirmation, 
classification and categorisation as conditions according to which they can be claimed as 
heritage.16 While its meaning, significance, and regulatory techniques may be debated, heritage 
                                                
9 Alain Pottage, ‘Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things’ in Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy 
(eds), Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things (CUP 2004) 6. 
10 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c 48. 
11  This approach draws on Serres’s multifaceted notion of parasite (social, biological, static) which both 
precedes and establishes systems of relations. Michel Serres, The Parasite (University of Minnesota Press 
2007); For a detailed explanation see Danilo Mandic, ‘Copyright and Technology: Hearing the Dissonance’ 
(PhD thesis, University of Westminster 2014) Ch 3. 
12 The ‘solemn declaration’ for the celebration of the centenary of the Berne Convention states: ‘that the law of 
copyright has enriched and will continue to enrich mankind by encouraging intellectual creativity and by 
serving as an incentive for the dissemination throughout the world of expressions of the arts, learning and 
information for the benefit of all people’. Adopted by the Assembly of the Berne Union on 9 September 1986, 
as reproduced in WIPO, (1986) 11 Copyright 373.  
13 From Latin hereditare ‘heir, heridity’; also, patrimonium ‘an inheritance from a father’. See eg Marilena 
Vecco, ‘A Definition of Cultural Heritage: From the Tangible to the Intangible’ (2010) 11 Journal of Cultural 
Heritage 321.  
14 See eg UNESCO, Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972  
15 Dicks contends that heritage is a cultural communicative practice and argues that this communication is not 
only between subjects, but between subject and an object of heritage. Bella Dicks, ‘Encoding and Decoding the 
People: Circuits of Communication at a Local Heritage Museum’ (2000) 15 (1) European Journal of 
Communication 61. 
16 Smith states ‘there is no such thing as heritage’, suggesting that what is recognised as heritage and their value 
is only a construction of the Western ‘authorised heritage discourse’ which frames, thus limits, the subject 
matter of heritage. Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage (Routledge 2006) 11; Harrison considers categorisation as 
the central process that creates heritage. Rodney Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches (Routledge 2013) 29-




can be considered a connector of people, places and things, but also a link between the past, 
present and future.  
 
Having a similar object of attention, which is subjected to claims of ownership, the relation 
between copyright and heritage has continuously been both affirmed and challenged. While 
the concept of cultural heritage has arguably been comparable to the notion of ‘cultural 
property’, this nevertheless indicates that ‘heritage’ still negotiates its status within the various 
discourses that enclose and view cultural expressions, resources, artefacts through the 
perspectives of property and ownership – the principles associated with the very legal tradition 
that copyright law originates from.17 Despite their different origination, the extent to which IP 
rights are able to provide the necessary framework for safeguarding of cultural heritage has 
been part of the instruments and discourses surrounding these two areas, or more precisely 
disciplines.18 Their ambiguous relation, as Fiona Macmillan observes, might be located in 
‘their competing invocation of intangibility’. Whereas intellectual property rights are ‘claims 
to intangible rights (albeit claims that often implicate tangible object)’, the cultural heritage 
rights are claims to (in)tangible properties. However, Macmillan continues, ‘what makes a 
tangible thing into cultural heritage is its intangible or symbolic association’, that is, a value 
that these objects carry beyond their material manifestation.19 On the basis of this fundamental 
distinction, another appropriate objection against overlapping their subject matter concerns 
their different understanding of authorship, and subsequently ownership. Copyright protects an 
individual expression, whereas cultural heritage ‘protects the expression of community beliefs, 
practices, values,’ monuments and sites.20 As such it is part of the cultural commons in which 
cultural heritage resides and thus fundamentally differs from the division between private and 
public domain that copyright’s circumscribing line entails. In line with this, finally, the third 
main objection concerns the duration of copyright protection, which is not compatible with 
protection of traditionally held heritage ‘which is by definition a practice passed across 
generations’, for which reasons it should arguably be safeguarded in perpetuity.21  
                                                
30; See also the selection criteria in the UNESCO, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World 
Heritage Convention WHC 17/01 12 July 2017.  
17 It is ‘strange to employ a legal concept that usually relates to ownership rights and then to state that it is being 
used without implying such rights, when alternative terms exist that are free of this historical baggage’ Blake (n 
3) 8; See also Lyndel V Prott and Patrick J O’Keefe, ‘“Cultural Heritage” or “Cultural Property”’ (1992) 1(2) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 307; Janet Blake, ‘On Defining the Cultural Heritage’ (2000) 49 
International and Comparative LQ 61; Fiona Macmillan, ‘The Protection of Cultural Heritage: Common 
Heritage of Humankind, National Cultural ‘Patrimony’ or Private Property? (2013) 64(3) Northern Ireland LQ 
351.  
18 On a discussion of heritage as discipline see generally Harrison (n 16). 
19 Fiona Macmillan, ‘The Problematic Relationship between Traditional Knowledge and the Commons’ in 
Simona Pinton and Lauso Zagato (eds), Cultural Heritage: Scenarios 2015-2017 (University Ca’ Foscari Press, 
2017) 679, <DOI 10.14277/6969-052-5/SE-4-42> accessed 25 May 2018; See also Blake (n 3) 10. 
20 Lixinski (n 3) 176. 
21 On heritage and IP more generally see Blake (n 3). On protection of intangible cultural heritage see Lixinski 
(n 3).  




For both copyright and cultural heritage, the main focus of consideration is thus the protection 
and promotion of an object that has a cultural significance. This object, while it metamorphoses 
in different forms and manifestations, is essentially infused with a meaning and value of culture 
and the worthiness it has for the history of human expression.22 From creation of cultural goods 
to dissemination of knowledge and creativity and their use, both copyright and cultural heritage 
refer to this quality of culture, which has framed their normative and discursive developments. 
More specifically, while not necessarily part of the declaratory acts and treaties, culture does 
appear to be both a cause and purpose for and to their existence. Accordingly, while in the 
copyright discourse it is associated with creativity, knowledge and learning, for cultural 
heritage it is the adjective that nominally designates and encompasses its essence. If for 
copyright culture is that what results from a system of circumscription, for heritage it is that 





 Ab urbe condita (…) What is said here is the foundation of the city and designates the 
book that follows the foundation. Yet the city is never completely founded; the thing is 
never assured. It’s the same for us, I mean for knowledge. Everything said here is said 
at a distance from the founded city, everything only has existence through this distance, 
through the length of this separation. The essential thing is the ab, or the from, which 
are, in fact, a starting from. A reference point, a point of departure, a bursting place 
(…) Rome never ceases being founded; its history or its time is simply what happens 
between two occurrences of the founding gesture (…) Rome is the city of beginnings. 
The beginning that we know is simply the time in which many beginnings accumulate.23 
                                    
Culture implies an existence of an origin. Origin has a meaning of source, that which gives rise 
to something.24 Culture is predicated upon origin that gives rise to something which needs to 
be cultivated. As the root of this word indicates, it can mean ‘to inhabit’, ‘cultivate’, ‘protect’, 
‘honour with worship’.25 The cultural theorist Raymond Williams suggests that the initial uses 
of origin implied a retrospective view of a static point in time ‘from which subsequent things 
and conditions have arisen’, while its later usage as ‘originality’ was associated with 
‘authenticity’ and ‘the description of something that is new.’26 The systems of copyright and 
                                                
22 Culture is an overburden notion that carries various meanings and serves different justifications and agendas, 
but for our purposes here it should be understood in its broadest sense (as an object of accumulation, process, 
and what distinguishes groups and localities). For an interesting discussion about the Cartesian dualism 
translated into the distinction between cultural and natural heritage, see Harrison (n 16) 63-64.  
23 Michel Serres, Rome: The First Book of Foundations (Bloomsbury 2015) 96-97. Ab Urbe Condita refers to 
the book by Titus Livius, or Livy, about the monumental history of ancient Rome. It is written in Latin between 
27 and 9 BC. 
24 From Latin originem ‘rise’, ‘beginning’ or ‘source’. 
25 From Latin colere or cultus. 
26 ‘As originality settled into the language it lost virtually all contact with origin; indeed the point is that it has 
no origin but itself.’ Raymond Williams, Keywords (Fontana 1983) 230-31.  




cultural heritage and the discourses they engender incorporate these two meanings of origin. 
Whereas for copyright law the origin is the first instance for its actualisation and therefore 
carries a prospective quality, for the cultural heritage the origin is that what is referred back to, 
and is thus retrospective. Nonetheless, the origin remains to be an active instance that 
continuously engenders, delineates and sustains culture, which in turn informs normative 
frameworks.27  
 
But what is the source of the origin? In his pursuance to contemplate the origin of our sciences, 
culture and knowledge, Serres notes that ‘Before the foundation, the inauguration takes place 
(…) The origin refers to another origin, the beginning demands a beginning (…) the foundation 
requires preliminaries.’28 There is always a white space that precedes the act of appropriation, 
sacrifice, killing. Animals indicate territorial rights with their droppings and markings. The 
stones and statues are the initial markers of corpses, which then marked a territory, which then 
became a pagus, field, dwelling.29 Serres refers to the myth of Romulus who killed and buried 
his rival brother Remus, and above his grave founded the city of Rome, thus becoming its 
proprietor and master. Bodily discharges and leaving marks appropriate places, and it is in this 
act of soiling the land, pollution, violence where we see the origins of our cultures, knowledge, 
nations, and the ‘forgotten foundation of property rights.’30 Indeed, ‘the original method of 
acquiring property, whether in lands or movables, was that of preoccupancy (prior of first 
occupancy), which the Romans denominated occupatio.’31 With this in view, origin should be 
understood as the original act of establishing boundaries and differentiation that gives rise to 
an object or culture.32 The philosopher Elizabeth Grosz observes origin as ‘a function of 
language’ and what constitutes it depends on ‘where we (…) decide to draw a line between one 
group and another that resembles it,’ or in this context one form of expression from another.33 
What constitutes our cultures is the act of making these divisions, which are supported by the 
very act of claiming an origin. This bifurcating nature of origin is also implicated in the notion 
                                                
27 This is certainly a political issue. Gibson, for instance, aptly points out that IP ‘is arguably the de facto author 
of legitimate “Culture” in Western society.’ She continues, it ‘purports to document the progress and civilisation 
of society, through the simplification and demarcation of Culture, while at the same time disguising the very 
selective process of that registration of Culture’. Johanna Gibson, ‘Freedoms of Knowledge, Access and 
Silence: Traditional Knowledge and Freedom of Speech’ in Fiona Macmillan (ed), New Directions in Copyright 
Law, Vol. 2 (Edward Elgar 2006) 202. 
28 Serres, Rome (n 23) 33. 
29 From Latin habere, ‘to inhabit’ has the same origin as ‘to have’.  
30 Michel Serres, Malfeasance: Appropriation Through Pollution? (Stanford University Press 2011) 34. See 
also, Danilo Mandic, ‘Listening to the World: Sounding Out the Surroundings of Environmental Law with 
Michel Serres’ in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Victoria Brooks (eds), Research Methods in 
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2017) 514-18. 
31 Although the term ‘occupancy’ was used in English law, Briggs for the purposes of avoiding ambiguity 
between the original and derivative acquirement employs the term of ‘preoccupancy’. William Briggs, The Law 
of Literary Property (WB Clive 1900) 7-8. 
32 ‘For decision about boundaries and borders appears to be original.’ Michel Serres, Geometry: The Third Book 
of Foundations (Bloomsbury 2017) 194. 
33 Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution and the Untimely (Allen & Unwin 2004) 21-23. 




of inheritance. For the common legal conception, as Pottage comments, ‘inheritance connotes 
a kind of social order and a mode of social action that is predicated upon an order of divisions’, 
and it indicates a conservation of this division as a ‘form of geometry through time’.34 What 
informs an origin is the initial cut or decision, the prime objectifying act.35 Origin, the ultimate 
circumstance. 
 
Accordingly, if there is one feature that frames the conceptual and normative foundations for 
both copyright law and cultural heritage it is the principle of origin. For a copyright to subsist 
the law requires an original expression that establishes the origin upon which it recognises the 
author and subsequently actualises the existence of property rights over that expression. It 
serves as an orienting principle according to which copyright subsists in a work or as a place 
of origin according to which law applies. Indeed, identifying the source is required to mark, to 
circumscribe, or for that matter, to initiate the legal gesture of property right protection. 
Copyright law refers to its literal meaning and it situates the act of originality as a source rather 
than quality: the ‘original’ does not imply that copyright law is ‘concerned with originality of 
ideas, but with the expression of thought (…) that it should originate from the author.’36 The 
originality thus is ‘culturally and historically determined’ that refers not to the object per se but 
the relationship established between the work and its creator.37 For the cultural heritage, 
similarly, the origin of in/tangible manifestations and expressions is not only the principle 
according to which belonging, identity and tradition are recognised and established; but it is 
the very binding link, bond, material thread that is crucial element for recognition.38 It serves 
to locate the object of manifestation ‘with its source of production’ that serves the individuals 
and communities related to that heritage.39 In that sense, the origin becomes a reference point 
for both copyright and heritage to be recognised, even when this origin is a subject of 
construction. 
 
                                                
34 Alain Pottage, ‘Our Original Inheritance’ in Pottage and Mundy (n 9) 251-2. 
35 Serres contends the emergence of an object in the juridical (political and critical) gesture of cutting, deciding 
on a case. Cause ‘case’ designates the origin of the word chose ‘thing’. Serres, Statues (n 1) 59. 
36 University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601, 608-609. 
37 Brad Sherman, ‘From the Non-original to the Ab-original: A History’ in Brad Sherman and Alain Strowel 
(eds), Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law (Clarendon Press 1994) 119-20; Smyth argues that 
‘originality enters into the basic structure of human relations, which are objectively constituted by judgments 
about it.’ John V Smyth, ‘Originality in the Enlightenment and Beyond’ in Reginald McGinnis (ed), Originality 
and Intellectual Property in the French and English Enlightenment (Routledge 2009) 199. 
38 Authenticity is understood as ‘original’ and as ‘having been frozen in time’. Sophia Labadi, ‘World Heritage, 
Authenticity and Post-authenticity: International and National Perspectives’ in Sophia Labadi and Colin Long 
(eds) Heritage and Globalisation: Key Issues in Cultural Heritage (Routledge 2010) 74; See also ICOMOS, 
Nara Document of Authenticity (1994) <https://www.icomos.org/charters/nara-e.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018. 
39 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed, UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/38, para 2 (21 March 2011). 




‘First of all,’ the first copyright statute does not mention origin.40  The inclusion of original as 
a doctrinal requirement can be traced with the emergence of the Romantic authorship by which 
the origin became an orienting principle for recognising legal claim, thus reinforcing the  pre-
given distinction that the notion of property rights entails.41 The ongoing criticism against the 
idea of a sole individual author who creates ab nihilo and the legal principle of origin has been 
discussed at length elsewhere.42  For our purposes here, it suffices to acknowledge, as Jessica 
Silbey rightly points out, that ‘the origin story serves ontological and epistemological 
functions’.43 Commenting on the beginnings of intellectual property, Silbey considers origin 
as a myth, by identifying its manifestations ‘as a heuristic [in the formation] of an individual 
and community’, as a ‘measure of authenticity to legitimate hierarchy’ and as a crucial element 
to reinforce political and social arrangements and consent.44 Indeed, copyright scholarship 
often returns and refers back to copyright’s origin.45 It engages with historical accounts and 
historicity, to trace the origins in order to not only historically situate copyright law but also to 
understand its legal development, enrich the investigation of its subject matter and better 
comprehend the present.46 While these historical investigations are telling and informing the 
corpus of copyright law discourse, as Kathy Bowrey aptly observes, the theoretical works of 
copyright history ‘dwell too much on reading copyright law with reference to its historically 
contingent origins, thus we need to view it from different perspectives,’ we need new 
narratives.47 This becomes even more crucial when these historical explorations engage with 
                                                
40 Iam premium omnium is the opening line of Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita. Serres, Rome (n 23) 33; Statute of Anne 
1710, 8 Anne, c 19. 
41 Martha Woodmansee, ‘On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity’ (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal 279; Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity’ (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 293; cf Oren Bracha, ‘The Ideology of 
Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright’ (2008) 18(2) Yale 
Law Journal 186.  
42 ‘The whole of human development is derivative. We stand on the shoulders of the scientists, artists and 
craftsmen who preceded us. We borrow and develop what they have done; not necessarily as parasites, but 
simply as the next generation. It is at the heart of what we know as progress’. Hugh Laddie, ‘Copyright: Over-
Strength, Over-Regulated, Over-Rated’ (1996) 18(5) EIPR 253, 259; See eg Jeremy Waldron, ‘From Authors to 
Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in intellectual Property’ (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841; 
Jessica Litman ‘Copyright as Myth’ (1991) 53 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 235, 248; Marcus Boon, In 
Praise of Copying (Harvard University Press 2010). 
43 Jessica Silbey, ‘The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property’ (2008) 15 George Mason Law Review 319, 
320. 
44 ibid 323-327, 342-359. 
45 Sherman and Strowel (n 37); Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property 
Law (CUP 1999); Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Hart Publishing 2004); See also Carla 
Hesse ‘The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C. - A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance’ (2002) 131(2) 
Daedalus 26. 
46 Lyman R Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Vanderbilt University Press 1968) 222-23; Sherman 
and Bently (n 45) 219-220. 
47 Kathy Bowrey, ‘Who’s Painting Copyright’s History?’ in Daniel McClean and Karsten Schubert (eds), Dear 
Images: Art, Copyright and Culture (ICA and Ridinghouse 2002) 269; Sherman and Bently (n 45) 220; Deazley 
attempts to rethink copyright by acknowledging the fact that the authoritative and objective commentaries upon 
copyright are polemical as they not only record and comment but ‘they seek to determine the conceptual 
parameters within which copyright is to be understood.’ Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, 
Language (Edward Elgar 2006) 8. 




copyright legal principles that, as Patterson comments, are not clearly defined and set in stone, 
that is, ‘Our ideas of copyright are a heritage of history.’48 Strongly imbedded in the various 
justifications that support its subsistence, copyright not only has cultural heritage as its object 
of protection and promotion, but manifests itself as a heritage of the Western thought that has 
evolved alongside various societal and political conditions and disruptions.49 Copyright, as 
well as cultural heritage, overlaps with origin: the origin becomes a self-referential quality.50 
Although a contingent phenomenon, subject to constant change, copyright nevertheless 
remains a static legal formation that is dependent on its origin to validate its objective and 
purpose. It is in this opposition that copyright law histories develop, where its tradition is 
inscribed, and what informs copyright as heritage. 
 
Comparably, heritage as continuously reflective on its past it initially served the ‘the role of 
the state in using particular objects to tell particular kinds of stories about its origins and to 
establish a series of norms with which to govern its citizens.’51 The origin is therefore not only 
about identifying object’s beginning but also about telling stories about the origins of the states 
and cultures, knowledge and law, about identifying foundations, inscriptions and rituals,  
embodied with and by time, which testify to both the fragility and stoniness of the human 
civilisation. Heritage, as well as copyright law, implies memories and informs the inheritance 
of values that need to be transferred and maintained. It is in this process when, Serres observes, 
‘Groups produce themselves by means of their culture and language, which develop and 
preserve them…against death and disappearance.’52 In this way, Serres contends that death 
precedes origin; the corpse is not only the first object to the human, but we are born from 
death.53 In legal terms, inheritance actualises only upon the death of an individual when 
property, titles, rights and obligations are passed on. In view of the opening quote, the impeding 
decay (death) becomes rather a creative force, with which time is founded, in which time is 
continuously constructed: culture is our technology ‘of this time of engendering centuries by 
means of centuries.’54 The creation of our culture is thus a reminder of our ‘undiminished 
capability to construct “collective immortality”.’55 It is this continuation, this temporal 
                                                
48 Patterson (n 46) 222-23. 
49 For a discussion on the distinction and principles of premodern and modern IP see Sherman and Bently (n 45) 
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50 In reading Darwin’s Origin of the Species, Grosz comments that Darwin does not provide any factual 
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which ‘presupposes an origin’ but ‘which is not an origin except in retrospect.’ Grosz (n 33) 21-23. 
51 Peter Howard, Heritage: Management, Interpretation, Identity (Continuum 2003) 42. 
52 Serres, Statues (n 1) 6. 
53 ibid 19-20; Serres, Geometry (n 32) xxxiii. 
54 ibid 7-8; Serres, Geometry (n 32) li. 
55 Maria L Assad, Reading with Michel Serres: An Encounter with Time (SUNY Press 1994) 114; Howard 
notes: ‘Apart from delaying death, heritage commemorates its failure to do so (…) Commemoration is often the 
alternative to conservation, and many heritage debates are between these two options.’ Howard (n 51) 96. 




formation that informs heritage’s value.56 What makes it more significant, nonetheless, is that 
the subject matter of protection is capable of establishing relations through which 
communication can traverse spatial and temporal scales, extending our comprehension of 
communication and its reach in building our collective culture.57  
 
We should, however, be cautious of heritage’s dissonant nature in which ‘the present selects 
an inheritance from an imagined past for current use and decides what should be passed on to 
an imagined future’.58 For these reasons, the heritage should not be approached (only) as a 
product, but referring to David Harvey’s account of heritage, also as a process.59 Although 
Harvey’s purpose is different in nature to ours, he aims to unlock the restricted view on heritage 
from the present, and calls for a historical approach that recognises the ‘heritage of heritage’ 
that temporally encompasses both present and future but also the processes that construct it.60 
From here, the source which gives rise to a particular cultural heritage marks the temporal 
beginning which presents itself as historical, or even pre-historical, gesture that frames or sets 
a particular duration of existence. ‘What makes certain activities “heritage”,’ Smith observes, 
‘are those activities that actively engage with thinking about and acting out not only “where 
we have come from” in terms of the past, but also “where we are going” in terms of the present 
and the future.’61 Thus, it is in this Janus’s two-faced direction of the durational process where 
heritage (both as a product and a process) actualises, where the origin is continuously re-
constituted, and becomes a subject matter to preservation for future use.62 This reference point 
seen from a distance, this movement of and across time, is what allows for the cultural heritage 
to manifest itself and continuously endure. As Serres observes, ‘Time moves forward by 
returning (…) along a line of origin (…) [which] is not a point, [but] ‘a long sequence of 
founding circumstances.’63  
 
                                                
56 In the famous essay of 1903 Alois Riegl proposes the criteria of age-value: ‘The category of monuments of 
age-value, embraces every artifact without regard to its original significance and purpose, as long as it reveals 
the passage of considerable amount of time.’ Alois Riegl ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and its 
Origin’ (1982) 25 Oppositions 21 in Michele Lamprakos, ‘The Idea of the Historic City’ (2014) 4(1) Change 
Over Time 8. 
57 For a discussion on the ambiguous notion of common heritage of humanity see Macmillan, Protection (n 17). 
58 John E Tunbridge and Gregory J Ashworth, Dissonant Heritage; The Management of the Past as a Resource 
in Conflict (John Wiley 1996) 6. 
59 Harvey considers heritage as verb and not a noun. David C Harvey, ‘Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: 
Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies’ (2001) 7(4) International Journal of Heritage Studies 
7 (4) 319. 
60 David C Harvey, ‘The History of Heritage’ in Brian Graham and Peter Howard (eds), Ashgate Research 
Companion to Heritage and Identity (Ashgate 2008) 19-36. Heritage is ‘not a thing or a place, but an intangible 
process in which social and cultural values are identified, negotiated, rejected or affirmed.’ Laurajane Smith and 
Emma Waterton, Heritage, Communities and Archaeology (Duckworth 2009) 44. 
61 Smith, Uses of Heritage (n 16) 84. 
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and ‘never-repeatable uniqueness of actually lived and experienced life.’ Mikhail M Bakhtin, Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act (University of Texas Press 1993) 2. 
63 Serres, Rome (n 23) 220. 




On that account, such disruption of the traditional view of origin as a point in time not only 
challenges copyright and heritage’s notion of origin as their organising principle, but confirms 
the temporal quality of an origin as a continuous founding circumstance to both their subject 
matter and themselves as institutions. Moreover, by referring back to copyright and heritage as 
relations, through which transmission of notions, ideas, skills, knowledge, principles and 





According to Ab urbe condita this is a year of 2771.64  
 
Having extracted temporality as an intrinsic feature of inheritance/heritage, here we start to 
think with and through time. Time is a complex phenomenon. Whereas time can be understood 
as universal or a clock time, temporality ‘is time insofar as it manifests itself in human 
existence’.65 In contrast to circular time, which is recurring, linear time implies beginning and 
an end. The latter, at least in the Western conception, signifies unidirectional progress that 
instils the dominating forms of organising social life and becomes a ‘central symbol of their 
legitimacy.’66 This understanding of time associated with progress is nowhere more implicitly 
or explicitly stated than in the purposes of intellectual property.67 Underpinned by the tradition 
of Enlightenment, the idea of progress has been moulding copyright’s shape ever since. The 
inclusion of time within the working of intellectual property law, more specifically copyright 
law, confirms how cultural conceptions of time have informed the principles of its legal 
institution.68 The focus here is not to trace the development of normative orders over time, but 
to think about ‘time’ as an inherent function of copyright law. But also of recognising time as 
‘integral to the ontology and epistemology of law.’69 
 
The discussion continues by considering how copyright law organises and produces time, but 
also, parallel to that to heritage, considers the temporality of its subject matter, objects of 
protection, and its subjects. If Henri Bergson is right then ‘Questions relating to subject and 
                                                
64 In the Gregorian Calendar this is the year of 753 BC. According to the same calendar this is the year of 2018, 
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object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than of space.’70 
However, the inclusion of time here is cautious not to engage, as Mariana Valverde points out, 
with the ‘old fallacy’ of the division between time and space within legal scholarship, but it 
has a purpose to recognise time as a quality to the scope, normative construction, and the 
narrative that law comes from and informs.71 Similarly to heritage, time and space are 
intrinsically intertwined and essentially constitute copyright law’s actualisation and 
permanence, however its temporal quality is foregrounded here.  
 
Similar to the two different meanings of chronos and kairos, Serres refers to other set of 
contradictory Greek verbs that the word ‘time’ derives from.72 Temno ‘to cut’, ‘from which we 
no doubt draw our measures and datings,’ and the other is teino ‘to stretch’ which signifies its 
continuous flow.’73 We arrive at the point where the three aspects – relation, origin, temporality 
– come together, overlap and ‘superimpose’. As similarly applicable to cultural heritage, it is 
precisely here, with this final distinction of time, that the qualities of relation, origin and 
temporality demonstrate their resemblance by carrying the simultaneous qualities of divisions 
and extensions, which give rise to both copyright’s subject matter and its edifice. It is from this 
position that copyright and its law is to be considered.  
 
Copyright law is 308 hundred years old. The historic point in time in which the origination of 
copyright is located can be traced back to the invention of printing press and the necessity to 
control the trading, that is censor the content, of printed books. But as the historical 
investigation has shown, such single origin is difficult to trace, as copyright is rather a result 
of multiple processes that had coincided at that time.74 For our purposes here, it is important to 
state that in the process of formulating and framing what would become the world’s first 
copyright act, the inclusion of time as a measure for protecting author’s copyrights was the 
main gesture in serving the purpose of limiting one’s rights in favour of what this new act, as 
given in its long title, aimed to achieve: An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting 
the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times 
therein mentioned.75 Authors of books and their assignees, were granted protection for 14 
years, which was subject to renewal, and a single 21-year term for works which had already 
been published. The question of time, however, was essential to the unsettled debate that 
                                                
70 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (Zone Books 2002) 71. 
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Wellbery (eds), Chronotypes:  The Construction of Time (Stanford University Press 1991). 
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74 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press 1993) 142. 
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followed the enactment of the bill, that is, of whether common law literary property is 
perpetual. The function of time was underlying feature in the conceptualisation of this right, 
mainly manifested between two opposite views but similar in their interest to protect the subject 
matter of literary property: those who viewed this right as a monopoly thus contended for a 
very short period, and those who aimed to prevent multiplying copies hence upheld perpetuity 
of the right.76 While there were two cases earlier that recognised the perpetual right in literary 
property, in 1774 with the case of Donaldson v Beckett the House of Lords overturned the 
previous decisions and recognised copyright as a statutory right, acknowledging the necessity 
of public domain, leaving the belief in a (common law) perpetual right, as a natural right, 
behind. While the purposes for a limited duration were intended to control the booksellers, and 
benefit the authors and public interest, the recognition of copyright law as a statutory right 
interrupted the time immemorial, the preliminary founding, the origin from where the 
booksellers derived their right.77 The notion ‘preoccupancy’ manifests itself in the temporal 
dimension of the time immemorial which denominates time ‘before legal history and beyond 
legal memory’, or as Blackstone refers to, a ‘time out of mind.’78 With the erection of the first 
copyright statute a new time begins.79 
 
This brief overview demonstrates time’s role not only in what preceded, but also in what 
constructed the body of copyright law. Time was integrated as a function to validate and 
materialise its property conception. Expanding over centuries, the copyright duration remains 
a chronic principle that is either identified as an instrument of regulation or as subject through 
which copyright’s detrimental expansion is being challenged.80 Legislative acts, as well as 
processes of internationalisation and harmonisation of copyright law further institutionalise 
and use time as a means of control.81 However, what essentially lies at the heart of this 
                                                
76 ibid 67-91. 
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justification, at least rhetorically, is the principle of inheritance.82 And while copyright 
discourse continuously returns to its inevitable history to write the time of copyright, time as a 
feature is presupposed of simply being there, almost ‘exterior’ to law’s existence.83 Considered 
as a temporal limitation to the existence of that very ‘intangible’ object that is subject matter 
of copyright’s protection, the temporal element is put only in the pragmatics of law’s 
functioning. This leads us to acknowledge, what Grosz finely points out, that ‘Time’s capacity 
to hide within objects, through and as things in time, means that to the extent that we focus on 
the nature of objects, we obscure the nature of temporality.’84 With this in view, the ending 
fleetingly touches upon different copyright times. 
 
The Cut and Stretch of Copyright Times: Materialising the Intangible 
 
Copyright law’s object is of a peculiar kind. A conceptual construction that concurrently 
applies to the intangible, mental activity, labour of the mind, expressed in a material form by 
which we can perceive it.85 In order to materialise this intangibility copyright law requires for 
the idea that is essentially timeless and no one’s property to be expressed, to leave a material 
trace and mark the origin. More specifically, what law does is attaching a temporal quality to 
these ideas in order to materialise them into property rights and instantaneously delineate their 
spatiality. Time, while ‘more intangible that any other “thing”,’ thus performs the function of 
concretisation of the very abstraction of copyright as a property right, regardless of the material 
nature in which its creations subsist.86 Thus it can be contended that time is not only a quality 
that complements justifications of copyright as property right, but acts as an embodiment, a 
quality that materialises the intangible, an all-encompassing matter essential to the functioning 
of copyright.  
 
Copyright law uses two different instances for measuring duration. First, it emerges at the 
moment of expression, which sets the beginning of something that ‘never’ existed before. The 
meaning of original implies origination. The initial expression becomes a function of property 
right, but also of time – more precisely, an instant that actualises the existence of property 
rights over that expression, when time as a measure gives copyright system its normative value. 
                                                
82 Recital 6: ‘The minimum term of protection laid down by the Berne Convention, namely the life of the author 
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The birth of the author, a personification of origin.87 Second, it takes the end of a human life 
(post mortem auctoris) as an additional measure according to which copyright’s end is 
determined. Death asserts itself as ‘a function of time’, a positive principle by which the natural 
time of human’s lifetime, although accidental, becomes a crucial instant for measuring 
copyright’s duration. 88 Despite the economic justifications for prolonging duration, it seems 
copyright law is one of the only laws that by protecting one’s rights after their death engages 
in activity to extend human life and through the protection of their rights legally recognise them 
posthumously.89 Indeed, copyright law has ever been ‘posthuman’.90   
 
Once expired, the duration obliterates the circumscribing fence and copyright works fall into 
public domain, the space without form or clearly defined boundaries, a reservoir of works 
outside protection.91 But this is not a space outside copyright, but a space that copyright gives 
rise to, encloses and reserves, by which copyright (pro)claims the realisation of its higher goal 
to further culture and knowledge.92 Copyright pursues towards the future, ascribing itself a 
futural significance by embodying heritage towards ‘collective immortality.’ As David 
Nimmer notes, ‘works are relegated to the public domain to become the heritage of all 
humanity and copyright is simply a temporary way station to reward authors on the road to the 
greater good.’93 Once copyright’s duration expires, the public domain becomes a container of 
works from the past transferred into the future. However, the prescription of copyright duration 
once elapsed, introduces another time that goes beyond the linear time: ‘Time passes and does 
not simply flow by passively; on the contrary, it forgets or effaces deeds and rights.94 In this 
                                                
87 On a discussion about the Renaissance concept of literary creation as inheritance, and authorship as paternity 
see Mark Rose, ‘Copyright and Its Metaphors’ (2002) 50 UCLA Law Review 1, 3-6.  
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94 Assad (n 55) 139; This reading reverses the legal notion of (acquisitive and extinctive) prescription where the 
effect of lapse of time is essential in creating or eliminating rights. Serres contends that prescription ‘admits the 




way copyright law from using time as to order a relation and control the existence of a copyright 
work, it suddenly forgets the right in order to immortalise the work.95 Copyright’s prescribed 
lapse of time forgets the right and in that moment as if it reverses the meaning and direction of 
‘time immemorial’.96 In a paradoxical way, however, only up to a point in time when another 
‘cut’ takes place and institutes a new origin, a new time. This leads us to recognise that while 
linear time as a measure serves the normative function for the institution of copyright, an 
attendance of another time embodies copyright law. For Serres, ‘Time does not always flow 
according to a line (…) rather, according to an extraordinarily complex mixture.’97 He takes 
the example of a handkerchief, which if flatten out shows points as ‘fixed distances and 
proximities’. Once crumpled ‘Two distant points suddenly are close, even superimposed’ 
indicating time is not linear.98 As such, events and objects that seem far from each other act 
contemporaneous, thus become ‘polychronic, multitemporal.’99 In other words, for Serres time 
‘passes and it does not pass’, thus it ‘percolates.’100 From this stance, it can be contended that 
copyright law (as well as cultural heritage) is capable to comprehend this topological time 
which simultaneously transcends and connects different temporal and spatial instances, and 
that goes beyond the linear time which copyright law normatively supports.  
 
Accordingly, copyright law is indeed a binding device, securing the continuance of its object 
of protection, its subject matter and its principles, but also of past, present and future. Serres 
considers that law institutes historical time and ‘it is therefore a cultural phenomenon (…) a 
stable invariant what we call “history or civilization.”’101 In that sense, ‘Through its codes and 
its texts,’ Serres notes, ‘law is an integral part of the memory of social computer.’102 The 
common law’s inherent feature of a precedent as a temporal instrument is an appropriate 
example for confirmation of this continuance and connection. As Gerald Postema notes, the 
precedent represents law’s memory of the past which also is ‘always bent to the present in 
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anticipation of the future,’ thus the two-faced Janus is indeed the patron of precedent.103 
However, in contrast to this ordered historical time, there is also a discontinuous, unexpected, 
disordered time that is devoid of unties, and which law also embodies. In his book Genesis, 
Serres uses the notion of noise to comprehend the multiple, to grasp time that cannot be 
represented, background noise, a turbulence that gives rise to forms, an emergent phenomenon, 
the ultimate origin: ‘Time is a pure multiplicity.’104 Law emerges from this timeless resonance, 
primordial reverberation: ‘Just as it creates our acts, real time creates law, and if it creates it, it 
dismantles it just as easily, and that is what the natural is – what keeps being born or risks not 





Rome, the Eternal City. 
 
Generalising, descriptive and at times speculative in nature, this paper aimed to temporarily 
interrupt the common thread by which copyright is discussed. In reading with and through 
heritage it identified similarities that provide a different starting position from which to discuss 
and problematise copyright and its law. In contrast to approaching copyright through its pre-
given organising principles of originality, authorship, property rights and ownership, here they 
remain in the background and the discussion focused on the aspects of relation, origin and 
temporality that both copyright and cultural heritage inherently embody and are dependent 
upon. By following their features, the discussion traversed different points, notions, meanings 
not to provide a conclusive study but instead in an open-ended manner to explore how relation, 
origin and temporality as qualities precede and inform the subject matter of copyright and its 
normative edifice. To put it another way, relation, origin, and temporality are not only essential 
to the formation and maintenance of cultural values, but they are also an integral part to the 
system of copyright, its conceptions, justifications, and higher goals. It is from this position, in 
rather idealistic manner, by which copyright has been approached. Copyright law is primarily 
a hereditary practice. It manifests itself a medium, link, a bridge that makes these connections 
of communication and dissemination of cultures; it establishes the origin, it carves the path, 
builds the infrastructural support of its system, and by doing so it not only preserves the objects 
of its attention but also itself. While implied throughout the paper, it held that all these 
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processes, intentions and gestures are inherently temporal in nature; hence, it proposes 
approaching copyright as a temporal category.  
 
Time is subsumed into copyright’s normative conceptions, and it is used to regulate and 
impose, to give rise to property rights, and inform narratives and their ‘timelessness’. This not 
only concerns copyright’s subject matter of transferring creativity and knowledge, but also 
law’s temporal existence, which allows considering copyright law and its functioning as a form 
of heritage. Time manifests itself as being a function to copyright’s binding nature. While 
copyright law takes time as a parameter or as a linear process where history and its instances 
are written,106 at the same time in order for it to produce order it seems it must maintain its 
image as a ‘guarantor of stability’ by stopping time,107 or rather present itself as timeless.  This 
timelessness should not be confused with the apt criticism towards viewing copyright as 
‘timeless, almost ahistorical, area of law that has always existed.’108 But rather, in the 
understanding of time as a quality that embodies and informs copyright law. As Postema 
observes, ‘Law exists in and persists through time, subject to forces, both rational and 
irrational, that operate in and through time.’109 This tracing of aspects, articulations and 
conceptualisations of times that copyright law engages with, embodies, and maintains, also 
calls attention to a quality that, although already pragmatically considered, has evaded 
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